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Abstract
Security measures that deter crime may unwittingly displace it to neighboring areas,
but evidence of displacement is scarce. We exploit precise information on the timing
and locations of all Italian bank robberies and security guard hirings/firings over a
decade to estimate deterrence and displacement effects of guards. A guard lowers
the likelihood a bank is robbed by 35-40%. Over half of this reduction is displaced to
nearby unguarded banks. Theory suggests optimal policy to mitigate this spillover
is ambiguous. Our findings indicate restricting guards in sparse, rural markets and
requiring guards in dense, urban markets could be socially beneficial.
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1 Introduction
Households and firms spend over a trillion dollars annually on security measures to
prevent crime.1 These private expenditures are intended to complement similarly
sized public expenditures. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a large literature in the social
sciences has emerged to estimate the effectiveness of these measures to deter crime.2
Moreover, the findings of this literature are increasingly used by public and private
decisionmakers to evaluate the allocation of law enforcement resources and compare
the effectiveness of private security measures.
An important side effect of any criminal deterrent is its potential to displace
crime. Broadly speaking, displacement is the effect of a security measure in one unit
on crime in neighboring units, where neighbors may be defined along dimensions
of time, space, or crime type, and units may be defined as individuals, firms, or
geographic areas. While criminal displacement should not affect an evaluation of the
private benefits of deterrence, it may lead to an overestimate of the social benefits
of deterrence, prompting a public intervention.
Surveying the criminology literature, Braga (2005) and Bowers et al. (2011) find
little evidence of crime displacement and more evidence of a diffusion of benefits,
though a central issue in all of these studies is that criminal perceptions are unob-
servable and, therefore, areas of displacement are likely to be misspecified.3 The
1In the US alone, households and firms spend nearly half a trillion dollars (Chalfin, 2013). The
OECD estimates that the US accounts for 40% of spending on security by member states (The Security
Economy, OECD, 2004.)
2See, for example, Chalfin and McCrary (2018), Nagin (1998) and Cameron (1988) for surveys on the
empirical literature on criminal deterrence.
3The criminology literature has argued that criminal spillovers can be positive or negative. On the
one hand, crime displacement reduces the benefits of focused policing. On the other hand, the benefits
of crime control may diffuse to nearby locations, generating additional benefits, though this might be
interpreted as a broader deterrent effect. Moreover, additional incapacitation generated by crime control
in neighboring areas may yield positive spillovers as well. A series of focused policing experiments have
analyzed changes in crime levels in neighborhoods that are contiguous to treatment areas (e.g., Braga
et al. (1999), Weisburd and Green (1995)).
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identification of displacement effects, while potentially important, raises multiple
endogeneity and measurement issues.
First, because crime is determined in an equilibrium between potential criminals
and potential targets of crime ((e.g., Furlong, 1987)), investments in crime prevention
reflect the underlying propensity of crime to occur. This will bias a regression of
attempted crime on the security investments of neighbors since they co-exist in a
similar environment.4 Moreover, firms invest in crime prevention in response to
changes to the underlying propensity for crime, which introduces issues of reverse
causality.
Second, crime is also determined in a strategic equilibrium between potential
targets of crime: the vulnerability of one target is generally a function of the vul-
nerability of alternative targets. Hence investments to increase the security of a
particular bank are made both in response to and are reflective of the investment
decisions of other banks. To the extent that neighboring firms operate in a similar
environment, this has the potential to introduce multicollinearity issues. Further-
more, since banks respond to one another, this may exacerbate simultaneity issues.
Finally, because units may not be well defined a priori, identification of displace-
ment effects may suffer from contamination. For instance, determining whether a
police patrol on one block displaces crime to a neighboring, unpatrolled block is
complicated by the fact that the patrol may indirectly deter crime on the neighbor-
ing block.5 All of these issues are further compounded by the fact that crime data
often suffer from measurement error.
The primary innovation of this paper is to identify displacement effects in a
4Spatial correlation in criminal activity gives rise to what are known as hot spots, small areas where
crime tends to concentrate. For an overview of the criminology literature, see Braga (2001).
5As Barr and Pease (1990) point out, it is difficult it to estimate displacement even in a controlled
experimental setting. Before starting a trial, researchers must take a stand on the spatial nature of
deterrence: if criminals perceive policing to be larger not just in treatment areas but also in control
areas, then estimates of displacement will suffer from contamination. Moreover, some displaced crime
will probably fall outside the areas and types of crime being studied or be so dispersed as to be masked
by background variation (p. 293).
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unique institutional setting with a geographically detailed data panel data set that
allows us to circumvent the empirical issues highlighted above. Specifically, we
estimate the extent to which hired security guards in Italian banks displace robberies
to neighboring bank branches. This is a rich criminal context, as bank robberies are
exceedingly common in Italy (the average bank faces a 7% risk of attempted robbery
in a given year). Using complete information on the robbery histories and installed
security measures of all registered Italian banks from 2000-2009, we find that the
hiring of a dedicated guard reduces the probability of a bank robbery between 2.7
and 4.4 percentage points (31 to 50 percent). However, this private deterrent effect
is substantially offset as robberies are displaced to nearby, unguarded banks: half of
the robberies deterred at guarded banks will spillover to a nearby unguarded bank.
No spillovers are found to affect nearby, guarded banks.
Since hiring guards generates a substantial negative externality on unguarded
banks, one might presume that a policy that dissuades hiring would be welfare
improving. However, we show with a simple theoretical model of displacement that it
is ambiguous a priori whether policy should dissuade or promote the use of criminal
deterrents when they displace crime. Underlying this counter-intuitive result is the
fact that crime may be displaced differentially across agents depending on their
deterrence choices. Because of this, agents may face a coordination game with
multiple equilibria when investing in deterrents.
Given this ambiguity, two broad types of regulations could be deployed to com-
bat displacement externalities: price regulations (a tax or subsidy on security in-
vestments) or quantity regulations (e.g., requiring security investments in all banks
or restricting security investments in all banks). Because we find that crime is dis-
placed entirely to unguarded banks, this suggests that the negative spillovers arise
entirely due to a lack of coordination in the hiring decisions of neighboring banks.
Hence, quantity regulations that drive investment decisions to a corner solution are
well suited to facilitate coordination (and mitigate displacement) as opposed to price
regulations that are more effective at interior solutions.
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With this in mind, we conduct simulation exercises that are based on our esti-
mated displacement effects to identify banking markets that are attractive candidates
for policies that promote the hiring of guards and banking markets that are attrac-
tive candidates for policies that dissuade the hiring of guards. We find that hiring
guards is unlikely to generate a social surplus in most of the country; however, guard
requirements in certain densely populated urban areas may be socially beneficial.
Moreover, we show that large multi-branch banks could reduce their exposure to
bank robberies by reallocating their guards across different branches.
Although we study the use of private security guards, our results contribute
to the broader economic literature that estimates the effect of policing on crime.
A number of studies have exploited plausibly exogenous, localized and persistent
increases in police guards stemming from terrorist attacks to estimate these effects.6
Our setting is well suited to the estimation of potential displacement effects, which
is often lacking in those analyses that rely on broader shocks. When it comes to
public security measures, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) find that car thefts
drop on blocks where police officers have been assigned to guard specific buildings,
but they find little evidence of an increase in car thefts in unprotected blocks.7 In
our context, private security guards are similarly salient, as they are positioned in
uniform in front of bank branches during business hours.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to the few studies that have tried
to estimate displacement effects of private auto-theft deterrents. Ayres and Levitt
(1998) show that car GPS-based tracking devices that are unobservable to thieves
reduce motor-vehicle thefts across the board. When the devices are observable, as
in Mexico, cars that are protected are less likely to be stolen but the attention of car
thieves appears to be diverted towards unprotected cars (Gonzalez-Navarro, 2013).
Similarly, van Ours and Vollaard (2016) find negative externalities for partially ob-
6see, e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005) Draca et al. (2011).)
7Donohue et al. (2013) reexamine the data, finding some evidence of displacement, though they
conclude that for lack of statistical power the inferences are not firm.
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servable car immobilizers.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a
simple model of crime prevention that describes the strategic relationship between
the security investment decisions of different banks and we propose an empirical
approach to identify deterrence and displacement effects that follows from the logic
of our model. In Section 3, we describe our unique data set of Italian bank robberies
and security investments. In Section 4 we present estimates of these effects. In
Section 5, we use our estimates to consider how the reallocation of guards by a social
planner or private banks could best lead to reductions in robberies. We conclude in
Section 6.
2 A Simple Model of Displacement
We present a model of crime prevention that delineates the roles of deterrence and
displacement. It is intentionally simple and stylized since our primary goal is to
explore the strategic interactions between banks that arise with displacement. The
main contribution of our model is the finding that a coordination game may arise
between banks; hence even if the direction of displacement externalities is known
to positive or negative, it is ambiguous as to whether security measures should be
encouraged or discouraged.9 The model also provides a conceptual basis for the
endogeneity problems in estimating criminal deterrence and displacement effects, so
it is a useful starting point for our empirical analysis.
8There is also evidence of temporal displacement in marine pollution, from the day to the night when
planes started to be used to monitor the North Sea for oil spills (Vollaard, 2017), while Vollaard and van
Ours (2011) find no evidence of displacement against old homes when burglary-proof windows and doors
become compulsory for new ones. But again criminals might simply move farther away than just a few
blocks.
9A theoretical literature on deterrence (and sometimes displacement) incorporates complexities such
as dynamic considerations Sah (1991), labor market considerations (Burdett et al., 2004, Clotfelter, 1977)
and time inconsistency (Lee and McCrary, 2009). In a more data-driven study Amodio (2019) shows
that households' investments in burglary protection depend on the investments of their neighbors.
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Banks i = 1, 2, ...N operate in a single market, which is defined as the set of
banks that are viewed as substitutes from the perspective of potential bank robbers.
Each bank chooses whether or not to hire a guard, which we denote as gi ∈ {0, 1}
respectively. The cost of hiring a guard, ci > 0, and the expected loss to i in the
event of robbery, Li > 0 may both vary by bank.
Each bank faces a probability of being robbed p(gi, g−i), where g−i is the number
of neighboring banks to i that hire guards. This specification of the probability of
being robbed is quite flexible, and it accommodates both deterrent and displacement
effects. We posit that
p(0, g−i)− p(1, g−i) ≥ 0 (1)
∂p
∂g−i
≥ 0 (2)
∂p
∂g−i
∣∣∣∣
gi=0
− ∂p
∂g−i
∣∣∣∣
gi=1
≥ 0 (3)
Equation (1) encapsulates the deterrent effect, and equation (2) encapsulates the
displacement effect. Equation (3) reflects the extent to which crime is differentially
displaced to unguarded banks versus guarded banks.
Putting this all together, bank i will hire a guard if its expected loss with a
guard, including the hiring cost, is less than its expected loss without a guard, or
p(1, g−i)Li + ci < p(0, g−i)Li (4)
We can rewrite this hiring condition to better highlight the strategic interactions of
banks as
p(0, g−i)− p(1, g−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(g−i)
>
ci
Li︸︷︷︸
λi
(5)
The left hand side can be thought of as the marginal benefit of hiring a guard in
units of expected robberies. We refer to this as the guard premium, which can be
specified as a function of a single argument pi(g−i) and is equivalent to the ability
of a guard to deter crime, given market conditions (see equation (1)). The right
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hand side can be thought of as the marginal cost of hiring a guard expressed in units
of expected robberies, which we specify with a single parameter λi. Note that the
guard premium does not directly vary with i but rather only indirectly with market
level conditions (through −i) whereas the marginal cost of hiring does vary directly
with i. For this reason, we can order banks by their propensity to hire a guard
without loss of generality as 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤, ...,≤ λN .
Within this simple framework, we derive the equilibrium decisions of all banks
summarized in Proposition 4.10 We define an equilibrium as a set of hiring decisions
by all banks such that no bank would benefit from unilaterally deviating.
Proposition 1. Suppose p satisfies equations (1)-(3) and exhibits a given positive
level of deterrence. Define λN+1 =∞ . Then
a (No Displacement) If equation (2) holds with equality, pi(g−i) ≡ pi(0) is a
constant function, and e0 banks in the market will hire guards in equilibrium,
where e0 uniquely satisfies λe0 < pi(0) and λe0+1 ≥ pi(0).
b (Existence) In equilibrium, e ≥ e0 banks in the market will hire guards for any
e that satisfies λe < pi(e− 1) and λe+1 ≥ pi(e).
c (Uniqueness) Let i be the smallest positive number such that pi(i− 1) ≤ λi for
some i. For all j > i such that λj < pi(j − 1) then i− 1 banks may hire guards
or j banks may hire guards in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 4 immediately follows from the fact that a bank i hires
a guard only if all banks j < i hire guards as well. This introduces an ordering into
banks' strategies and allows equilibrium to be determined by the marginal bank that
would hire a guard. The marginal bank can simply be recovered by comparing the
relative positions of λi and guard premia. If multiple λi are positioned between the
10We ignore the trivial case where there is no deterrent effect, as no bank would hire a
guard (ci > 0).
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relevant guard premia, then displacement may allow for the existence of multiple
equilibria.
We provide intuition for the results of Proposition 4 in a series of diagrams. In
panel (a), there is a deterrent effect but no displacement, so the guard premium
for each bank does not vary with other banks' hiring decisions. Hence, those banks
whose costs are below the fixed guard premium (equal to pi(0)) will hire guards (as
shown in black) and those banks whose costs exceed it will not hire guards (as shown
in gray).
In panel (b), we introduce displacement. This generates variation in the guard
premium. As more guards populate the market, the guard premium increases, so now
two banks find it optimal to hire guards. However, this is not the unique equilibrium:
because λ3 and λ4 are positioned between pi(2) and pi(3), a coordination game has
emerged between banks 3 and 4. In panel (c), we show a second equilibrium in which
four banks now find it optimal to hire guards. While it is profitable for neither of
these banks to hire a guard or for both of them to hire a guard, it is never profitable
for only 3 to hire a guard. Finally, the degree of differential displacement does not
qualitatively affect these results. Greater differential displacement will only increase
the distances between pi(i) and pi(j) (keeping the position of pi(0) unchanged).
Because displacement is an externality, it is useful to compare the competitive
equilibrium described in Proposition 4 with the socially optimal allocation of guards
under displacement. Displacement is a negative externality that is ignored by banks
in the competitive equilibrium, so basic intuition would suggest that an unregulated
market would feature too many guards. This intuition, however, is flawed since
displacement may create coordination games amongst banks. Consider the case of
panels (b) and (c) in Figure 1, and suppose that the socially optimal number of
guards in this market is 3.11 The multiplicity of competitive equilibria implies that
one equilibrium will feature too many guards while the other will feature too few.
We summarize this in the following proposition:
11It is straightforward to see that this can be supported by some combination of ci's and Li's, as the
number of free parameters (8) exceeds the number of constraints that pin down this set up (5).
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Proposition 2. The socially optimal number of guards in a market may be higher
or lower than the number of guards that would be hired in a competitive equilibrium.
An immediate policy implication of Proposition 2 is that it is not obvious whether
regulation should encourage or discourage the hiring of guards, despite the fact
that they generate negative externalities. A multiplicity of equilibria arises because
consecutive λi lie between the respective guard premia  intuitively, as banks become
more homogeneous (i.e., the distances between their λi diminish). Indeed, we might
expect this to occur quite frequently since banks hire guards from a common local
market (reducing variation in ci) and nearby branches, catering to similar customer
bases, may hold a similar amount in reserves (reducing variation in Li). Hence policy
ambiguity may be the rule rather than the exception. We capture this intuition in
the proposition below.
Proposition 3. Complete Coordination.
a If pi(0) < λ1 then an equilibrium exists in which no banks hire guards.
b If pi(N) > λN then an equilibrium exists in which all banks hire guards.
Proposition 3 states that a complete coordination game among banks will arise
when banks are similar (λ1 is not too different from λN ), deterrence is relatively
low (pi(0) is small) and displacement is relatively high (pi(N) is very different from
λN ). We use intentionally vague terms to describe these conditions because many
combinations of market characteristics may sustain multiple equilibria and policy
ambiguity.
Finally, we should note that standard policies that are used to correct external-
ities may offer very different performance in this setting. Price regulations, such
as Pigouvian taxes or subsidies, can be easily incorporated into the model as they
operate entirely through ci. For instance, a tax will shift the locations of all λi to
the left. While that effectively decreases the value proposition of deterrence by
strengthening the first condition of Proposition 3, it weakens the second condition
of Proposition 3 and only increases the dispersion of the λi to the extent that the Li
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vary. Hence, taxes may be ill suited to fix the conditions underlying coordination
problems between banks. On the other hand, quantity regulations, such as guard
requirements or restrictions can eliminate the coordination problem entirely by forc-
ing all banks to a particular equilibrium. Of course these may be less attractive
when a market does not suffer from complete coordination problems.
3 Data
We have been granted access to the yearly Census of Bank Branches collected by
the Italian Banking Association (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) between 2000 and
2009. We observe the precise location (latitude and longitude) of each bank, which
allows us to assign them to markets of varying size. Branch managers whose bank
has signed up an agreement with ABI about bank robberies are required to inform
the ABI's research center on crime against banks (OSSIF12) whenever their branch
is victim of a crime.13 For each branch, we observe a full history of all attempted
robberies. The Census also contains a full history of investments in 37 distinct
security measures. These include most importantly the hiring of guards in addition
to the installation of deterrents such as bulletproof glass, security vestibules, time
locks, etc.
As shown in Figure 2, the spatial distribution of banks in Italy generally follows
the spatial distribution of population and economic activity. Distinct clusters corre-
spond to major metropolitan areas, and there is greater bank density in the wealthier
North. Robberies are also clustered in major cities though they occur throughout
the country. The distribution of security guards mimics the distribution of robberies,
which portends a number of the endogeneity issues in identifying displacement that
we previously raised.
Summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1.
12Website: www.OSSIF.it.
13The number of agreements increases over time. Overall our dataset covers 71 percent of robberies.
Between 2004 and 2009 the percentage goes up to 83 percent.
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On average, bank branches risk 0.07 robberies per year, and 8 percent of them
hire security guards. When focusing on provinces with a below-median number of
attempted robberies the numbers drop to 0.04 and 0.04, respectively, while they
increase to 0.10 and 0.13 in provinces with an above-median number of attempted
robberies. When assigning bank branches to 500m by 500m squares, about 40 per-
cent have no neighboring banks. When the market size increases to 50km by 50km,
almost all bank branches have neighboring banks. Bank robberies were stable for
most of our sample period, though there has been a secular decline in the total
number of robberies beginning starts in 2008 (see Appendix Figure 1).14
The spatial distribution of the hiring and firing of security guards that gives rise
to longitudinal variation in the use of security guards is shown in Figure 3. It is
fairly clear that firings are more common than hirings, which is consistent with the
banks trying to disinvest in security guards.
Finally, we present raw evidence that banks' security investments are highly
correlated and increasingly so over time. In Figure 4, we compare each bank with
its nearest neighbor. The least common configuration has one bank with a guard
and one bank without a guard, and such pairs have become rarer over time. Of
course, this observed correlation might simply be an artifact of random chance as
opposed to coordination. As such, we compute the baseline probability that two
neighboring banks would have made the same investment decision by chance.15 In
panel (a) of Figure 5, we present the fraction of bank pairs that have made the same
investment decisions in each year alongside this baseline. Banks tend to behave
similarly, and this behavior is increasing over time. While these facts are consistent
14Previous research has shown that a 2007 spike in robberies was driven by a collective pardon that
freed about 20,000 inmates in the second half of 2006 (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2014). Interestingly,
the trend in bank robberies for the US is surprisingly similar to the Italian one after 2007. According
to Marco Iaconis, head of the Security Office of the Italian Banking Association, this is driven by the
increased use of vaults with time-locks, which severely limit the amount of cash that is quickly available
to the tellers.
15If pt is the fraction of banks with guards in a given year in a given province, this number is p
2
t+(1−pt)2
for all banks within that province.
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with displacement effects generating coordination games between banks, they may
simply reflect the fact that neighboring banks share a common environment. Hence,
we should not conclude that displacement effects exist from this observation alone.
In panel (b) of Figure 5, we restrict our attention to bank pairs in which at least
one of the banks has hired a guard. In 2000, over 40% of all bank pairs featured
both banks with guards. Given that 20% percent of banks in 2000 hired a guard,
we would expect only 20% of bank pairs to both hire guards if hiring was truly ran-
dom. Although the use of guards declined over the sample period, the gap between
observed coordination and a random baseline remained large (approximately twenty
percentage points) and persistent. This is also suggestive, though not dispositive, of
coordinated behavior.
4 Empirical Approach and Results
Following equations (1)-(3), deterrence and displacement are features of the function
p. Our data presents a unique opportunity to estimate this function directly. For
bank i in market j observed in year t, we specify the regression equation
rijt = β1gijt + β2g−ijt + β3gijtg−ijt + ijt (6)
where rijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a robbery attempt was made on bank i
in year t, gijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i had a guard in period t, and
g−ijt is equal to the fraction of banks in market j (other than i) that were guarded
in period t.16 It follows that β1 can be interpreted as the deterrent effect, β2 can
be interpreted as the displacement effect, and β3 can be interpreted as the degree of
differential displacement between guarded and unguarded banks.
Estimation of these effects is complicated by the fact that unobservable determi-
16We specify g−ijt as a fraction instead of number in order to estimate a displacement effect that is
invariant to market size. This is advantageous because the size of markets is unknown a priori, which
leads us to compare estimates across many different market definitions.
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nants of robbery in the error term, ijt, are certainly correlated to the hiring decision
of bank i. Indeed, the guard hiring condition (equation (4)) features the probability
of being robbed p prominently. Moreover, these unobservables should be correlated
to the hiring decisions of other banks in the market.
The fact that banks strategically make decisions in a common environment in-
troduces yet another source of endogeneity into equation (6). Because g−i enters
directly into equation (4), each bank's hiring condition is implicitly a function of
its neighbors' hiring conditions as well. Hence, not only are unobserved environ-
mental factors subsumed in Li and pi potential sources of endogeneity, but those
factors subsumed in L−i and p−i are as well. In the language of Manski (1993), the
displacement effects β2 and β3 correspond to correlated effects. These effects are
difficult to disentangle from the factors that led that competitor to hire the guard
in the first place, as i's expectations over these factors enter into i's strategic hiring
decision. We attempt to identify these effects by exploiting the panel structure of
our data along three dimensions: across banks, across markets, and over time.
First, we note that banks are clearly located in markets of varying sizes (see
Figure 2), yet there is no a priori correct definition of a market. By properly
defining a market and controlling for market specific characteristics, we may be able
to control for confounders related to the common environment shared by banks. To
do so, we group banks into markets indexed by j, where markets are defined by
subdividing Italy into squares of equal area bounded by latitude and longitude. We
take no prior stance on the size of a market and instead conduct our analysis on
squares of varying dimensions.17
Now, note that while the identification of the simple deterrent effect of a guard
(β1) is subject to the same concerns as the identification of displacement effects it
17In order to make sure that our results were not affected by effects at the boundaries of markets,
we re-estimated all of our results by shifting the grid" of markets by various amounts and found no
systematic differences in our estimates. Specifically, if markets were defined as kkm by kkm, then we
reestimated all of our results by shifting the grid of markets by k(1 + δ) to the North and East for
δ = 0.1k, 0.2k, ..., 0.9k.
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should not be a affected by the size of the market in which a bank operates. This
suggests an empirically driven approach to assessing whether we are able to control
for common environmental confounders with fixed effects that capture smaller and
smaller markets. In the limiting case of a market with just a single bank branch
we are only exploiting within variation over time, which we later discuss introduces
misclassification problems around the timing of the hiring and firing of guards.
Consider the following deterrence regression equation:
rijt = β1gijt + λj + λt + ijt (7)
where β1 now represents a simple deterrent effect, λj is a market fixed effect and
λt is a flexible yearly time trend. As this equation is specified under successively
smaller market definitions, the set of confounders encapsulated in ijt shrinks, but
the simple deterrent effect should be unaffected. Hence, if estimates of β1 are largely
unaffected by any choice of j below a certain threshold, then we might conclude that
our fixed effects can successfully control for environmental confounders related to
deterrence (e.g., the local propensity for crime, local labor market conditions, etc.)
We present the results of this exercise in Table 2.18 In specification (1), we
include no market fixed effects and obtain a small and insignificant estimate of
deterrence. This is because the deterrence and endogenous investments presumably
cancel each other. As we begin to control for local conditions in specifications (2)-
(6), we obtain statistically significant and increasing estimates of deterrence effects.
The one but last column presents the number of market fixed effects, that is the
number of squares used to cover the country. The coefficients become more negative
as the number goes up from 6 regions to 651 regions. In specifications (7)-(12),
with market sizes between 25km by 25km and 500m by 500m we obtain stable and
statistically significant deterrence estimates of roughly 4 percentage points. This
suggests that unobserved local conditions would bias our estimates of deterrence
18In all results presented, we estimate robust standard errors clustered by 50km squares. The statistical
significance of all of our results is essentially unchanged if we instead cluster at the market j level.
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downward (i.e., in a more positive direction), which is consistent with our model
since a higher propensity for robbery would induce banks to hire guards.
The limiting" case of this exercise is the inclusion of bank-fixed effects (λi)
presented in specification (14). These estimates reflect a tradeoff between reverse
causality due to measurement error and a greater ability to absorb environmental
confounders.19 Because we only observe whether banks hired a guard by the end of
the year, we may mismeasure whether a robbery was attempted on a guarded bank
versus an unguarded bank, leading to downward biased estimates of deterrence. In
specification (14), β1 is identified only off of variation in hiring within banks over
time, so this problem may be particularly acute as the misclassification is amplified.
Indeed, we estimate roughly half as strong a deterrence effect. In specification (15),
we attempt to mitigate this tradeoff by omitting all observations in which a guard
was just hired or fired (i.e., gijt 6= gijt−1). Doing so delivers an estimate of deterrence
in line with what we estimated using market fixed effects.20
Importantly, all estimates in specifications (6)-(13) and (15) are precisely mea-
sured and not statistically significantly different from one another. We take this
as evidence that these fixed effects plausibly control for environmental confounders
due to deterrence. This implies that the inclusion of these fixed effects in the full
regression equation
rijt = β1gijt + β2g−ijt + β3gijtg−ijt + λj + λt + ijt (8)
19This is related to an important point raised by Chalfin and McCrary (2018) in their estimation of
the effect of police on crime with aggregate crime regressions. Fixed effects regressions may seriously
exacerbate measurement error bias when police staffing is measured with some error.
20In Appendix Table 1, we re-estimate deterrence effects for specifications (1)-(13) on the restricted
subsample that omits all observations in which a guard was just hired on fired. Our estimates are essen-
tially unchanged, except for the smallest market size (250m by 250m). This suggests that misclassification
error in hiring/firing is not an issue in regressions with market fixed effects. Note that we are unable
to exclude observations in which a neighboring bank in the market just hired a guard because it would
dramatically reduce our estimation sample. Hence, this is an imperfect solution.
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will yield estimates of displacement (β2 and β3) that could be biased only by con-
founders that (1) vary over time within markets, (2) vary across markets within a
year, and most importantly (3) are uncorrelated to confounders that also influence
the deterrent effect of a guard.
We estimate equation (8) defining markets from 50km squares down to 250m
squares and present our results in Table 3. In all specifications, our estimates of
deterrence (β1 + β3 ∗ g−ijt) are nearly identical to our estimates in Table 2, which
confirms the extent to which this research design addresses the potential endogeneity
due to shared environments of competitor banks.21 The effect of any potential
confounder that varies by both time and by market will generally change as we
define markets differently. The fact that all deterrence estimates are roughly constant
across specifications suggests that endogeneity related to market definition, which by
construction includes most confounders that release contextual effects, is controlled
for.
In contrast, the displacement effects that we estimate vary considerably by mar-
ket definition. This is not surprising, as not all banks within a given market may
be equally substitutable from the perspective of a robber, and this heterogeneity
will be more stark in larger markets. In large markets, we find no evidence of dis-
placement. In markets smaller than 1 km2, we find displacement effects of 1.5-2
percentage points to unguarded banks (β2). Specifically, if an unguarded bank's
neighbors hires guards, the branch is probability of being robbed will increase by
roughly 20%. However, we find no statistically significant displacement effects to
guarded banks (β2 + β3), even in the smallest markets. This suggests that policies
that incentivize all banks to make security investments will suffer less from reduced
effectiveness due to negative displacement externalities.22
21In order to use those observations for which a bank has no neighbors to estimate deterrence effects,
we flag them with a dummy variable equal to 1 and present the estimated coefficient.
22In Appendix Table 3, we re-estimate our baseline results on two subsamples of markets: those with
branches that are more similar on the basis of their use of all security device, and those with branches
that are less similar. Consistent with our theory, we find that deterrent effects of guards are strongest in
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Although the specifications in Table 3 are well suited to control for confounders
related to the shared environment of banks in a market, they are less well suited to
control for confounders related to a particular bank's propensity to be targeted in
a robbery attempt. Including bank fixed effects, as in specification (14) of Table 2
might address this problem, but it would also make endogeneity due to measurement
error in the timing of guard hiring more acute. Moreover, our prior strategy of
dropping observations when guard status switches is inapplicable here since we would
not be able to define g−ijt in a consistent manner that excluded this error.
Instead, we attempt to address this potential source of endogeneity by including
a richer set of controls related to the timing of robberies. In Table 4, we present
four specifications of our main regression with markets defined as 500m by 500m
squares. The first specification is a pure replication of our main regression. In
specification (2), we add market-specific linear time trends to more flexibly control
for time varying unobservables, and our estimates are essentially unchanged. In
specification (3), we control for the number of other security devices besides guards
that banks have in operation, and our estimates remain unchanged.23 In specification
(4) we add market-specific quadratic time trends and, again, the estimates change
very little.
In columns (2)-(5) of Table 5, we present the results of a number of additional
robustness checks. In specification (2), we restrict our estimation to a pre-2008 sub-
sample, when the number of bank robberies was quite stable and obtain broadly
similar results. In specification (3), we relax the assumption of linearity in displace-
ment spillovers by specifying the fraction of neighbors with guards quadratically.
Our estimates of deterrence are similar, and we still find statistically significant
evidence of displacement, though we are unable to precisely estimate differential
displacement. In specifications (4) and (5), we include lagged robberies as controls
markets with less similar branches, whereas displacement effects of guards are strongest in markets with
more similar branches.
23We should note that the correlation between the use of a guard and the number of security devices
is extremely low (0.02). In first differences, this correlation is even smaller (0.015).
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in order to assess the extent to which we have addressed simultaneity issues. Our es-
timate of β3 is slightly reduced, and we can no longer precisely estimate a differential
displacement effect on this smaller sample.
To summarize, hiring a guard reduces the probability that a bank is robbed in a
given year by roughly 40% off of a base of 7 percentage points. If such a bank has
neighboring banks within 500m without guards, then roughly half of this reduction
will be offset by robberies that are displaced to those banks. However, neighboring
banks who already employ guards do not suffer any additional robberies due to
displacement.
5 Displacement Policies
Displacement spillovers indicate a role for policy. We focus on spatial displacement,
assuming that crime displacement and spatial displacement do not interact. While
it is difficult to measure displacement across crime types, Mastrobuoni (forthcom-
ing) measures transition probabilities within the broader category of commercial
robberies. Since robbers are likely to move to different targets before moving to
different crimes altogether, these numbers are indicative of potential displacement
across crime types.
Mastrobuoni (forthcoming) shows that bank robbers operating in the city of
Milan have a very high degree of specialization. Conditional on robbing a bank,
there is a 90 percent chance that a robber's next target is a bank even though banks
constitute only 10 percent of victims. Conditional on robbing a business that is not
a bank, the chance that a robber's next target is a bank drops to less than 2 percent.
The institutional characteristics of a particular market  the number of banks,
likelihood and costs of robbery, and costs of guards  determine whether displace-
ment should be addressed by an increase or a decrease in the use of guards. These
characteristics are difficult to observe, but we can use our empirical results in con-
cert with our theoretical model to assess which markets are the most attractive
candidates for different types of public and private policies.
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Our parameter estimates pin down a fundamental object of our model: the guard
premium. Specifically, pi(0) = −β1 and pi(N) = −(β1 + β3). If hiring costs are
constant across banks in a market, we can simply apply Proposition 3 to determine
the range of losses (Li) for which completely coordinated equilibria exist. Assuming
an annual cost of e40 thousand for a security guard,24 it follows that an equilibrium
with no guarded banks will exist if L1 <e1.37 million, and an equilibrium with all
guarded banks will exist if LN >e662 thousand.25
It is likely that some market exists in which every bank will face a loss of less
than e1.37 million in the event of a robbery, hence an equilibrium exists in which no
banks in Italy hire guards. However, this need not be the socially optimal outcome.
Indeed, in certain highly urban markets, it is likely that some bank will face a
loss of greater than e662 thousand in the event of a robbery; in those markets, an
equilibrium with all banks hiring guards also exists.
Without detailed information on ci and Li for all banks, we cannot identify
which equilibrium generates greater social benefits in a particular market. Instead,
we consider four counterfactual scenarios to explore which markets are most likely
to benefit from the use of more guards, and which markets are most likely to benefit
from the use of fewer guards. We do so from the perspective of a national policymaker
with the ability to enact local policies that could increase or decrease the total
number of guarded banks. These policies could take the form of extreme quantity
restrictions as suggested by theory, or more gentle restrictions that gradually increase
or reduce the number of guards in a market.
24According to the Italian Banking Association, banks follow the wage rules (Tariffe di Legalita' ) set
by the Ministry of Interior. In 2007 the hourly wage of a private security guard set by the Ministry was
e24,27. With an average opening time of 7 hours for 5 days a week the yearly cost is close to e44,000.
25One may surmise that the use of guards is a proxy for broader security investments which may cost
substantially more than e40 thousand per year. However, the extremely low correlation between the use
of guards and the use of other security devices in our sample suggests that our estimates reflect the use
of guards per se.
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Scenario 1: Banning Guards
The natural policy response to a negative externality would be to discourage the
use of guards. Suppose banks were no longer permitted to hire guards. Then the
predicted change in the number of robberies in each market would be given by
∆rijt =
∑
[β1gijt + β2g−ijt + β3gijtg−ijt]
For each 500m by 500m market, we simulate the total increase in robberies that
would arise from implementing such a policy in 2005 using our preferred specification.
We aggregate the changes in these markets into 25km by 25km squares for visual
clarity and overlay them on a map of Italy in Figure 6.
In the first panel, we present the absolute effects of this policy. In much of the
country, banning guards would lead to no more than 5 additional robberies. However,
in metropolitan areas, we might find much greater increases. For instance, Rome,
Naples, Milan and Palermo would experience more than 50 additional robberies.
Because this policy would mechanically have a greater effect on large population
centers, we present the relative effects of this policy in percentage terms in the
second panel. As before, certain more heavily populated areas (Genova, Florence,
Bologna, Rome, Naples) would tend to experience greater increases in robberies.
This result is consistent with the intuition of Proposition 3. Large, urban markets
will tend to have more banks, and hence greater scope for heterogeneity among
banks. This should increase the likelihood that a coordination game would arise
that would generate at least one equilibrium in which there would be no negative
externality as too few banks would hire guards.
Scenario 2: Requiring Guards
If instead all banks were required by law to hire guards, the predicted change in the
number of robberies in each market would be given by
∆rijt =
∑
[β1(gijt − 1) + β2(g−ijt − 1) + β3(gijtg−ijt − 1)]
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We present the effects of this policy in Figure 7. As before, we present the
absolute increase in robberies from guard requirements in the first panel. Not sur-
prisingly, the greatest reductions in robberies are concentrated in the most densely
populated areas that feature the greatest number of potential targets. These in-
clude the relatively wealthy Po' river valley in the north (which includes Milan,
Turin, Bologna and Venice) along with the major cities of Rome, Naples, Bari and
Florence, all of which are covered by the darkest squares. In the second panel, we
instead look at the relative effects of guard requirements. In pretty much the entire
country, robberies would decrease by over 75%. Of course, this does not imply that
universally requiring guards is the optimal policy since hiring comes at some cost.
Scenario 3: Gradual Removal of Guards
In the third scenario we consider a less extreme counterfactual in which we deter-
mine the net number of additional attempted robberies that would we expect if we
optimally removed a single guard from a single market taking into the account that
this might displace crime to other neighboring banks. We then repeat this exercise
by optimally choosing a second market from which we remove a guard, then a third
market, and so on.26
We present the results of this exercise in the first panel of Figure 8. As shown
in the first panel, the benefits of removing guards at the margin are small  the
500 least effective guards in Italy deter fewer than 10 annual robberies altogether.
However, these marginal effects do increase since successive removals creates more
newly unguarded banks that are susceptible to crime that is displaced from still-
guarded banks.
If we instead select markets for guard removal on the basis of losing the least
26In all of our simulation exercises, we restrict ourselves to a single change per market to avoid the
computational burden of an exponentially more complicated dynamic programming problem. Despite
the fact that this does not necessarily yield the globally optimal reallocation of guards, we believe that
it does provide useful benchmarks on the marginal values of the second, third, and so on guards who are
added or subtracted.
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expected amount to robbery instead of simply allowing the fewest number of ad-
ditional robberies, we arrive at similar results. We estimate the expected cost of
a robbery at a bank as the average amount stolen from all attempted robberies in
that bank's province (provincia) in a given year. As shown in the second panel
of Figure 8, each removed guard increases the expected amount lost to robbers by
approximately e250, though this does increases to close to e1000 at the margin.
Scenario 4: Gradual Addition of Guards
In the fourth scenario, we consider the analogous counterfactual in which we in-
crementally add guards to unguarded banks. As shown in Figure 9, adding guards
has a small effect, as each additional guard deters approximately 0.6 robberies in
expectation. Each added guard reduces the expected amount lost to robbers by
approximately e1000, though this eventually declines to approximately e400.
Although the monetary values of a marginal guard implied by these exercises
suggests that guards will not justify their salaries, we must caution that our analysis
fails to account for other external costs of robberies beyond the robbers' haul. In
particular, the perception of the added safety from guards may be valued quite
highly by banks, their employees and their customers. Without knowledge of the
private costs of exposure to robbery risk and the cost savings from not hiring guards,
we cannot definitively identify optimal regional policies for security investments at
banks.
Nevertheless, our analysis does suggest that banks in sparsely populated areas
should be discouraged from hiring guards  of the small number of robberies that
are deterred, a relatively large proportion will be displaced to nearby banks that
are likely to be unguarded. On the other hand, large cities may want to consider
encouraging the use of guards in local banks. Given the preponderance of targets
and the relatively high exposure to robbery, encouraging the use of guards might
generate meaningful deterrence that would not be displaced if other nearby banks
were also guarded.27
27A fundamentally different type of policy might involve restrictions on Li, perhaps through cash
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5.1 A Bank-level Approach
In practice, the decisions to hire and fire guards belong to individual banks. We
accordingly consider an alternative counterfactual in which banks optimally relocate
a guard from one of their branches to another and then compute the simulated change
in robberies that would result from such a decision. While banks do not consider
the spillover effects of their decisions in our simulation, the change that we simulate
covers all banks and hence includes these spillover effects.
We present the results of this simulation in Figure 10. If roughly 20 banks
swapped guards, each of these swaps would eliminate approximately 0.06 robberies.
This reduction is primarily driven by the movement of guards from markets with
many unguarded branches to markets with few unguarded branches. These moves
will displace fewer robberies to unguarded branches. Of course, such markets may
be rare, hence many banks with branches in fewer markets (or markets with less het-
erogeneous guard allocations) would generate much smaller reductions in robberies
from these swaps.
6 Conclusion
Understanding whether visible security measures displace crime or extend deterrence
to nearby areas is crucial for the design of intelligent law enforcement strategies.
Unfortunately, the empirical challenges in identifying and estimating such effects are
considerable. Based on a series of randomized control trials that increase policing
in some well-defined areas, criminologists have embraced the idea that displacement
is at most limited and that benefits from increased policing diffuse to nearby areas
(see Bowers et al., 2011, Braga, 2005). However, these studies must all contend
with the inescapable fact that criminal perceptions are unobservable, which requires
researchers to take a stand on how criminals perceive the spatial distribution of police
holding regulations. Such regulations might compress variation in λi, and hence, following the logic
of Proposition 3, potentially increase the likelihood of a socially suboptimal coordinated equilibrium in
which no banks hire guards.
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changes. This is critically important from an empirical perspective, as misspecifying
these perceptions can easily contaminate any analysis in favor of finding diffused
benefits of deterrence as opposed to displacement of crime (Barr and Pease, 1990).
Meanwhile, when economists have attempted to estimate deterrence effects of police
patrols in quasi-experimental settings (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004, Draca et al.,
2011, Klick and Tabarrok, 2005), they have suffered from insufficient statistical power
to measure potential displacement.
In this study we estimate deterrent and displacement effects of highly visible
private security guards of commercial banks. In line with a game-theoretic model
where banks' strategically invest in security measures, we find robust evidence that
banks respond to the hiring and firing of guards operated by nearby banks. Our
unique institutional setting allows us to circumvent numerous identification threats
inherent to the measurement of displacement: we observe all potential targets of
crime (and hence all potential units that could experience displacement), their pre-
cise spatial relationships with each other, all relevant attempted crimes, and all
strategic responses of banks to one another.
Consistent with the existing economic literature, we find that visible guards act as
a substantial deterrent to potential criminals. Unlike previous studies, we find that
much of this reduction in crime is deflected towards nearby bank branches: about
half of attempted robberies that are deterred by a security guard are displaced to
nearby banks, but only to those that are unguarded.
Each year Italian banks spend about e200 million on security guards (Mas-
trobuoni and Rivers, 2019) to combat an epidemic of robberies. Our findings have
immediate policy implications. The displacement effects that we estimate indicate
a important role for the coordination of security investments by neighboring banks.
Indeed, we find strong evidence that certain banks overinvest in security guards in
an uncoordinated fashion. Policies that promote coordination, either by encouraging
all banks to hire guards or by encouraging all banks to fire guards, could efficiently
reduce the victimization of banks in the aggregate. Given Italy's indubitable status
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as an outlier in robbery risk, such policies have the potential to generate substantial
benefits to banks, consumers and law enforcement.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in Guard Hiring
(a) No Displacement, e0 = 1
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
pi(0)
(b) Displacement, e = 2
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
pi(0) pi(1) pi(2) pi(3)
(c) Displacement, e = 4
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4
pi(0) pi(1) pi(2) pi(3)
Note: Black dots represent banks who hire guards and grey dots represent banks who do not.
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Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Banks, Guards, and Robberies
Notes: Each red dot represents a bank branch. The black dots in the left panel represent banks that
have been victimized from 2000 and 2009 and in the right panel represent banks with security guards.
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Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Hiring and Firing of Security Guards
Notes: Each red dot represents a bank branch. The black dots in the left panel represent the hiring of
security guards, the ones in the right panel represent the firing of security guards.
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Figure 4: Bank Pairs by Guard Status
Neither Guarded
Both Guarded
One Guarded
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Notes: Each bank is compared with its nearest neighbor.
33
Figure 5: Coordinated Hiring and Firing of Guards
Frac. of Bank Pairs with Same Guard Status Propensity of Bank Pairs to Coordinate with Guards
Observed
Random Baseline
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Notes: Each bank is compared with its nearest neighbor. In each panel, we compare coordination with
a corresponding baseline that we would expect if guards were randomly assigned to banks within
provinces.
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Figure 6: Simulated Increase in Robberies from Banning Security Guards
(a) Absolute Increase (b) Percentage Increase
Notes: Changes are simulated in 2005 using our preferred specification (column (4) of Table 4) with
markets defined as 500m squares and then aggregated to the 25km by 25km level for visual presentation.
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Figure 7: Simulated Decrease in Robberies from Requiring Security Guards
(a) Absolute Decrease (b) Percentage Decrease
Notes: Changes are simulated in 2005 using our preferred specification (column (4) of Table 4) with
markets defined as 500m squares and then aggregated to the 25km by 25km level for visual presentation.
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Figure 8: Simulated Marginal Effects of Removing Guards
(a) Increase in Robberies
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Notes: Changes are simulated using our preferred specification on data from 2005. All amounts robbed
are denominated in 2005 e.
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Figure 9: Simulated Marginal Effects of Adding Guards
(a) Decrease in Robberies
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Figure 10: Simulated Changes in Robberies from Moving Guards Across Bank Branches
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Notes: Changes are simulated using our preferred specification (column (3) of Table 4) with markets
defined as 500m squares. Simulations are performed with data from 2005.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Whole Sample, N=245,712
Number of Robberies 0.07 0.30 0 5
Guard 0.08 0.27 0 1
Number of Security Devices 7.48 4.94 1 36
No substitute branches in the 500m markets 0.41 0.49 0 1
No substitute branches in the 50km markets 0.00 0.02 0 1
Panel B: Provinces with Below Median Robberies, N=125,401
Number of Robberies 0.04 0.22 0 4
Guard 0.04 0.19 0 1
Number of Security Devices 7.59 5.22 1 36
No substitute branches in the 500m markets 0.46 0.50 0 1
No substitute branches in the 50km markets 0.00 0.02 0 1
Panel C: Provinces with Above Median Robberies, N=120,311
Number of Robberies 0.10 0.36 0 5
Guard 0.13 0.33 0 1
Number of Security Devices 7.36 4.61 1 34
No substitute branches in the 500m markets 0.36 0.48 0 1
No substitute branches in the 50km markets 0.00 0.02 0 1
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Table 2: Simple Estimates of Deterrence in Successively Smaller Markets
Dependent Variable: Number of Robberies
Market FE Deterrent effect SE Obs # Spatial FE R-squared
(1) None -0.0043 (0.0041) 245,712 0 0.0051
(2) 800km -0.0068* (0.0040) 245,712 6 0.0073
(3) 400km -0.0142*** (0.0037) 245,712 12 0.0109
(4) 200km -0.0193*** (0.0036) 245,712 28 0.0134
(5) 100km -0.0275*** (0.0035) 245,712 74 0.0183
(6) 50km -0.0345*** (0.0036) 245,712 211 0.0239
(7) 25km -0.0402*** (0.0037) 245,711 651 0.0303
(8) 10km -0.0426*** (0.0038) 245,707 2773 0.0418
(9) 5km -0.0441*** (0.0038) 245,695 5644 0.0568
(10) 2km -0.0430*** (0.0041) 245,670 9509 0.0829
(11) 1km -0.0421*** (0.0040) 245,643 12748 0.1061
(12) 500m -0.0386*** (0.0042) 245,612 16775 0.1329
(13) 250m -0.0338*** (0.0044) 245,577 21059 0.1590
Bank FE
(14) All years -0.0157*** (0.0040) 244,742 33672 0.2174
(15) Excluding switching years -0.0366*** (0.0064) 203,696 31077 0.2276
Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by 50km squares in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Estimates of Deterrence and Displacement Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Number of Robberies
Guard (β1) -0.0348*** -0.0373*** -0.0391*** -0.0407*** -0.0382*** -0.0369*** -0.0318*** -0.0289***
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0051)
% Neighbors with Guards (β2) 0.0020 0.0063 0.0058 -0.0001 0.0109 0.0181** 0.0169** 0.0147*
(0.0271) (0.0236) (0.0149) (0.0118) (0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0081)
Guard × % Neighbors with Guards (β3) 0.0014 -0.0148 -0.0171 -0.0171 -0.0231 -0.0200 -0.0336*** -0.0260**
(0.0286) (0.0271) (0.0231) (0.0192) (0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0131)
No substitutes -0.0315 -0.0178 0.0053 0.0064 0.0062* 0.0075** 0.0085*** 0.0073**
(0.0321) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Square fixed effects 50km 25km 10km 5km 2km 1km 500m 250m
Year fixed effects
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 245,712 245,711 245,707 245,695 245,670 245,643 245,612 245,577
R-squared 0.0239 0.0304 0.0418 0.0568 0.0830 0.1062 0.1330 0.1590
β1 + β3g−ijt -0.0347 -0.0385 -0.0405 -0.0420 -0.0398 -0.0382 -0.0335 -0.0298
p-value (β2 + β3 = 0) 0.920 0.781 0.615 0.351 0.339 0.863 0.113 0.348
Average n. of neighboring branches 357 170 65.62 32.83 10.96 4.989 2.464 1.539
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by 50km squares in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 4: Deterrence and Displacement Effects with Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Robberies
Guard -0.0318*** -0.0321*** -0.0318*** -0.0342***
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0049)
% Neighbors with Guards 0.0169** 0.0170** 0.0169** 0.0190**
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0085)
Guard × % Neighbors with Guards -0.0336*** -0.0343*** -0.0336*** -0.0245
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0151)
Number of Security Devices 0.0005*
(0.0003)
Neighbors Average Num. of Sec. Devices -0.0006*
(0.0003)
No substitute bank 0.0085*** 0.0045 0.0085*** -0.0048
(0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0045)
Market (500m) and Year FE
√ √ √ √
Market specific linear time trends
√ √
Market specific quadratic time trends
√
Sample Full Full Full Full
Observations 245,612 245,612 245,612 245,612
R-squared 0.1330 0.1331 0.1330 0.1941
p-value (β2 + β3 = 0) 0.113 0.103 0.114 0.704
Note: Column 2 restricts the analysis to years before 2008. Robust standard errors
clustered by 50km squares in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Robustness Regressions for Deterrence and Displacement Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Robberies
Guard -0.0342*** -0.0378*** -0.0322*** -0.0323*** -0.0309***
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0060)
% Neighbors with Guards 0.0190** 0.0162 0.0490** 0.0181** 0.0163*
(0.0085) (0.0112) (0.0216) (0.0092) (0.0091)
Guard × % Neighbors with Guards -0.0245 -0.0324** -0.0494 -0.0186 -0.0198
(0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0442) (0.0184) (0.0191)
% Neighbors with Guards squared -0.0370
(0.0267)
Guard × % Neighbors with Guards squared 0.0281
(0.0478)
Lagged Number of Robberies -0.0473*** -0.0538***
(0.0057) (0.0057)
Lagged Num. of Robb. against Neighbors -0.1358***
(0.0081)
No substitute bank -0.0048 -0.0093* -0.0050 0.0048 -0.0020
(0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Observations 245,612 187,897 245,612 210,702 210,702
R-squared 0.1941 0.2366 0.1941 0.2084 0.2142
p-value (β2 + β3 = 0) 0.703 0.294 0.992 0.982 0.854
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by 50km squares in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
A Proofs
Lemma 1. Bank i will hire a guard only if all banks j < i hire guards.
Proof. We proceed by induction. Let k be the smallest number such that gk = 0. By
construction, k−1 banks hire guards, and because gk = 0, pi(k−1) < λk. Therefore
pi(k−1) < λk+1, hence gk+1 = 0. By induction, no bank k′ > k will hire a guard
Proposition 4. Suppose p satisfies equations (1)-(3) and exhibits a given positive
level of deterrence. Define λN+1 =∞ . Then
a (No Displacement) If equation (2) holds with equality, pi(g−i) ≡ pi(0) is a
constant function, and e0 banks in the market will hire guards in equilibrium,
where e0 uniquely satisfies λe0 < pi(0) and λe0+1 ≥ pi(0).
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b (Existence) In equilibrium, e ≥ e0 banks in the market will hire guards for any
e that satisfies λe < pi(e− 1) and λe+1 ≥ pi(e).
c (Uniqueness) Let i be the smallest positive number such that pi(i− 1) ≤ λi for
some i. For all j > i such that λj < pi(j − 1) then i− 1 banks may hire guards
or j banks may hire guards in equilibrium.
Proof. a If equation (2) holds with equality, then pi(0, g−i) = pi(1, g−i) for all
values ofg−i. Without loss of generality, we can call this pi(0). By inequality
(5) A bank will hire a guard if and only if λi < pi(0). The claim follows from
the fact that the λi are weakly increasing.
b Equation (2) implies that pi is a weakly increasing function in g−i. The claim
follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.1.
c Since pi(i − 2) > λi−1 and pi(i − 1) ≤ λi by assumption, an equilibrium exists
in which banks 1, ..., i − 1 hire guards. Since λj < pi(j − 1), by Lemma 1 an
equilibrium also exists in which banks 1, ..., j hire guards.
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